Inter-American Dialogue
As China scholar and China and Latin America Working Group member, David Shambaugh, mentioned in Adrian Hearn’s and Jose Luis Leon-Manriquez's China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, interest in studying China and Chinese language is growing in Latin America, but there is still a very low level of understanding among the region's people and governments. Latin America’s China- and/or Asia-focused studies programs are very limited, as evidenced by the map below (click on red markers for more information), where we’ve assembled some of the region’s major Asia studies programs and Asia-related research centers. They range from well-respected universities and top-notch institutions like UNAM’s China-Mexico Studies Center to small schools offering extracurricular courses in tai chi or Chinese calligraphy. Though not included on our map, Latin America also boasts twenty-one Confucius Institutes and eight Confucius Classrooms. Confucius Institutes are established in coordination with Hanban, a division of China’s Ministry of Education that promotes Chinese culture and language abroad.
View Academic Programs in Latin America in a larger map
Though often thought to have the upper-hand in regional studies, China’s understanding of Latin America is also very limited. The country has several think tanks dedicated (at least in part) to the study of Latin America – CASS ILAS, CICIR, and SIIS, for example, conduct very good Chinese-language research on the region’s history, economy, politics, policies, and foreign relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) China Institute of International Studies and the Ministry of Commerce-affiliated Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation also employ Latin America experts with impressive Spanish and Portuguese language skills. The MFA’s Latin America experts have studied at SAIS and other U.S. educational institutions. In total, however, there are only about fifty scholars/experts in China that focus specifically on Latin America. Many of them are listed HERE. Latin American studies programs in China’s universities are also very limited, usually residing in history departments. Nankai, Fudan, Peking, and Jianghan Universities all have centers for Latin America studies within their history departments. Sichuan Foreign Studies University, Zhejiang Foreign Studies University, and the Southwest University of Science and Technology recently established institutes of Latin American studies, though all seem to focus primarily on language study.
Most all China-Latin America relations experts have recognized the need for greater cross-regional understanding between Latin America and China. As China’s role expands in Latin America, countries are in desperate need of China experts and Chinese speakers to develop trade ties, promote investment, negotiate effectively, challenge counterproductive stereotypes, and encourage multi-faceted bilateral relationships. Latin American businesses with little understanding of Chinese culture, business practices, or commercial regulations, find operation in China to be extremely daunting. The same can be said for Chinese firms operating in Latin America, and especially for China’s small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Friday, December 9, 2011
India's approach to oil acquisition in Latin America: A Chinese perspective
Dr. Sun Hongbo, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), and member of the Inter-American Dialogue’s China and Latin America Working Group, recently published the following article in Chinese journal《能源》, or Energy.
The article examines India’s "小步子," or "small step" approach to oil acquisition in Latin America, and suggests that India’s approach may be preferable at times to China’s more aggressive and spontaneous energy-related engagement with the region.
Sun explains that India’s relations with Latin America have warmed over the past few years as a result of two primary factors: domestic pressure on both sides to expand trade and investment, and an interest in strengthening ties in the context of a shifting global power dynamic. Sun also points out that India’s oil-related cooperation in Latin America has, in fact, strengthened the country’s political relationships with its partners in the region.
According to Sun, India’s “small step” approach to energy acquisition in Latin America is based on its national energy security interests, as well as on the capital endowments and pace of internationalization of India’s oil companies. But India also considers several other factors when investing in the region, including countries' resource potential, political stability, and the nature of bilateral relations with potential partners.
From 2006 to 2010, India has launched eighteen cooperative oil exploration projects in Latin America -- the vast majority (75 percent) of which are in Brazil and Colombia. According to Sun, India has very few cooperative projects with the region’s leftist governments, which it may consider less reliable. India’s oil-related investments are also fairly small in comparison to China’s billion dollar deals – they very rarely exceed $10 million.
Because of its smaller footprint and very calculated approach to investment, India rarely encounters resistance on the part of host governments in the region – nor do its investments generate significant public opposition, according to Sun.
When operating in Latin America, China’s oil companies should consider not only China’s domestic energy needs and their own international operational interests, but also regional politics, specific policy changes, and other diverse factors, Sun argues. China should seek out cooperative opportunities in Latin America, but must "steadily and cautiously" avoid "blindness" when operating abroad, or a tendency toward "swarming" (蜂拥而上). China, Sun argues, can learn from India’s cautious and strategic investment, which involves successful risk assessment and responsible examination of country-specific investment opportunities.
“拉美寻油”的印度模式
孙洪波印度正成为继中国之后第二个大举投资拉美的亚洲能源消费大国,相比中国的大手笔,小步徐图的“印度模式”对中国有着特别的借鉴意义。
最新的BP世界能源统计显示,2010年,印度从拉美进口石油1100万吨,占其全球总进口的6.16%。拉美成为继中东和非洲之后,印度第三大石油进口来源地。
由此,印度正成为继中国之后,又一个走进拉美寻油的亚洲能源消费大国。
为什么看上拉美？
无论是从新兴经济体的密集度来看,还是从对全球治理进程的影响来说,拉美都不再是传统意义上被“边缘化”的外围角色。印度作为正在崛起的新兴大国,近年来为谋求政治大国的外交空间,积极发展与巴西、阿根廷等拉美大国的关系。
特别是印度和巴西极力谋求“入常”,形成了两国新的政治联系纽带。印度在拉美寻油,会在很大程度上为印度带来所需的“政治红利”。
印度与拉美大国政治关系升温源自两个方面的动力:一是彼此迫于国内发展压力,相互寻求扩大贸易、投资的“增量”机遇;二是鉴于国际格局转型中各种力量组合变化的复杂性,彼此期望外交上互相借重。
印度与拉美的政治互动以经贸合作为支撑,以确保其能够在拉美获取资源、开拓市场空间。就石油合作而言,印度与巴西等国的政治接近无疑推动了石油合作,而石油合作反过来又有助于加强政治关系。
政治考虑之外,印度自身的能源需求和拉美国家丰富的石油资源,成为挺进拉美的根本所在。
印度石油探明储量极为有限,且近年变化不大。据BP世界能源统计,截至2010年底,印度石油探明储量12亿吨,占全球探明总量的0.7%。而石油消费占全球比重高达3.9%。而OPEC公布的统计数据则更少,印度石油探明储量仅占全球的0.4%。
在这一背景下,印度的石油消费却高企不下。2010年,印度石油消费318.24万桶/日,国内原油产量仅为73.56万桶/日,而原油进口高达259.79万桶/日。粗略估算,印度对外石油依存度已超80%。印度作为人口大国,经济发展处于加速期,能源特别是石油消费急剧增加,进口逐年攀升,使得能源安全问题格外突出。
拉美丰富的石油储量自不待言,委内瑞拉、巴西和墨西哥的石油储量远远超过印度,仅秘鲁、厄瓜多尔和哥伦比亚三国探明储量之和,就与印度的探明储量旗鼓相当。为确保石油供应安全,拉美自然地成为印度原油进口多元化不可忽视的替代来源地。
BP世界能源统计显示,印度从拉美的石油进口由2008年的770万吨,上升到了2009年的1180万吨,2010年虽略有下降,也超过了一千万吨;其中,墨西哥、委内瑞拉、巴西和哥伦比亚是印度在拉美的主要石油进口对象国。
印度在拉美的能源利益不仅仅局限于原油进口,而且印度国家石油公司(ONGC)还视拉美为国际化经营的战略要地。印度国家石油天然气公司是维护印度国家能源安全的主要组织载体和实施者,与政府的密切政治联系以及公司自身的国际化战略都推动了该公司向拉美扩张,其子公司Videsh是拓展拉美业务的执行者。
从政府层面看,油气合作是印度与拉美主要油气生产国重要的经贸合作领域,而印度国家石油公司把拉美看作其实施“国际化”经营的重要目标区,在实现企业成长的同时,更加切实保证了国家能源安全。
印度的“小步子”
尽管印度的石油公司进入拉美较晚,但合作上升势头迅猛。
2006年-2010年,印度在拉美的石油勘探开发合作项目累计18个,分布在巴西、委内瑞拉、哥伦比亚、古巴等国。巴西和哥伦比亚是印度在拉美的重点合作对象国,两国集中了12个合作项目,占到了印度在拉美合作项目的75%。
基于谨慎的投资态度,印度与拉美左派执政国家的合作项目不多。例如,印度与委内瑞拉的合作始于2008年,当前仅有的两个合作项目进展缓慢。显然,印度与拉美石油合作的国别选择无不考虑到对象国的资源潜力、政策稳定性、双边政治关系等多个因素。
除了慎重选择投资国家外,印度在拉美的石油投资规模较小,多笔投资仅仅是上千万美元,超过上亿美元的投资项目不多。
据Videsh公司公布的数据,截止到2011年3月底,该公司在拉美的实际投资额约15亿美元,其中,对巴西和哥伦比亚的投资分别为8亿多美元和5亿多美元。2006年-2010年,Videsh公司在拉美的18个合作勘探开发项目中,绝大多数投资都在一亿美元以下。
尽管每笔投资规模偏小,但这种积极参与、小步前进的投资策略,无论是以印度国家石油公司在拉美油气市场的参与度来看,还是以印度从拉美进口的原油量来衡量,都确保了印度在拉美的能源利益。
在合作方式上,印度国家石油公司采取了控股、参股、联合勘探开发等多种合作形式。2006年5月,印度国有石油公司Videsh收购了壳牌公司在巴西坎波斯盆地深海BC-10区块15%权益;2008年-2010年,Videsh公司与巴西国家石油公司合作,增持了BM-SEAL-4、BM-BAR-1、BM-S-73、S-74共四个区块的部分权益。
在哥伦比亚,Videsh公司分别持有RC-8、RC-9、RC-10三个海上区块的40%、50%和50%的权益,余下权益主要由哥伦比亚国家石油公司持有。2008年4月,印度国家石油天然气公司(ONGC)与委内瑞拉国家石油公司成立合资公司,两公司分别持有60％和40％的股份,共同勘探开圣克里斯托瓦尔油田(San Cristobal);2010年2月,两国又启动了卡拉波波-1(Carabobo-1)油田合作项目。
在合作伙伴选择上,印度的一个显著特点是看重与拉美本地的国家石油公司合作,而与欧美的跨国石油公司合作相对较少。
对中国的启示
印度与拉美石油合作的最大特点是以参与为主,投资步子小,收益大。
印度进入拉美的这种“小步子”符合印度当前国家能源安全利益以及印度国家石油公司的资本实力和国际化步伐。而且,“小步子”投资不会引起东道国的政治抵制,也不会轻易激发东道国民众和社会舆论的抵触。
这一点对中国石油(601857,股吧)公司的海外投资有一定的启示意义。中国与拉美石油合作,可综合考量国家的能源利益需求、石油公司国际化经营的地区布局以及拉美当地的政治、政策变化特点等多种因素,一方面,应捕捉合作机遇,另一方面,进入拉美应稳健、审慎,减少“走出去”的盲目性,避免出现“蜂拥而上”的冒进局面。
印度重视与拉美本地石油公司合作,确保了国家的能源利益,其投资产出效率值得中国借鉴。中国油气海外投资不能不计投入产出关系,海外投资规模的大小和海外并购数量的多少仅仅是判断“走出去”是否成功的重要参量,但不是全部,此外,还应考量“走出去”的成本问题。
即使是战略性投资,也应建立完善的风险评估、投资审查和责任追究机制。当前的“走出去”也许看重的不是短期的投资回报,可能会带动国内就业、设备和技术服务出口等相关收益,但让社会了解企业“走出去”的社会贡献也是必不可少的。
Wednesday, December 7, 2011
What is Latin America saying about China? Nov 5 - 28
Inter-American Dialogue
We've compiled Latin American news articles on China and China-related issues. Click below for news highlights:
Some top stories:
We've compiled Latin American news articles on China and China-related issues. Click below for news highlights:
November 5 -11, 2011
November 12 - 18, 2011
November 19 - 28, 2011
Some top stories:
- Argentina is going to great lengths to increase agricultrual exports to China. It signed agriculturally-focused bilateral agreements with China and is actively promoting consumption of Argentina's agricultural goods (especially beef and dairy) through exchanges and trade missions to China. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries recently held an exchange with China on seed technology. Chile and Uruguay are also actively promoting their agricultural products in the Chinese market.
- China is increasingly interested in Ecuador's quinoa and cocoa, according to Ecuadorian press.
- China is currently Ecuador's largest creditor and the Correa government is said to be pursuing an additional $1.5 billion line of credit with China.
- China's work on Bolivia's Tupac Katari satellite continues. The satellite is scheduled for launch by 2013 or early 2014. Bolivia will also purchase six helicopters from China, according to a statement made by President Morales.
- China demonstrated continued interest in Brazil's energy sector in November. China's largest wind turbine manufacturers are eyeing the Brazilian market. Chinese firm Sinopec recently purchased shares of Portuguese firm Galp Energia, which is active in Brazil's oil sector. According to an article in Brazil's Jornale, however, as many as 25 percent of China's proposed investments in Brazil over the past two years have not come to pass.
- China has stepped up its engagement with certain Caribbean nations. A National People's Congress delegation visited Suriname, Antigua & Barbuda, and Barbados in November. China's Harbour Engineering Company is building an airport terminal in Guyana, and is also active in Jamaica. China's tourism sector investments also continue, such as those in the Bahamas-based Baha Mar resort and the Marriott Guyana Georgetown Hotel.
- Venezuelan congressman Miguel Angel Rodriguez called the China-Venezuela Fund unconstitutional, arguing that it brings little benefit to the people of Venezuela. The fund, according to the congressman, is causing structural damage to PDVSA. Other opposition politicians have also criticized the China-Venezuela relationship in recent weeks.
Thursday, December 1, 2011
China’s Burma Blues: A Lesson in Risk Assessment
Inter-American Dialogue
When Chinese firm CPI initiated plans for a project on Burma's Irrawaddy River a few months ago, few predicted the public backlash that would ensue. Burma’s abrupt halt of a $3.6 billion Chinese-backed hydro project on September 30th was jarring to Chinese leaders and investors, who perceived Burma as a fairly welcoming investment destination.
As explained in a Washington Post slideshow on the dam debacle, many in Burma are concerned not only about the social and environmental impact of China’s projects, but also about the nature of their country’s broader relations with China. There is significant concern that Burma is becoming “China’s vassal state,” according to former military commander and veteran democracy activist Tin Oo. China is thought to be unfairly exploiting Burma’s natural resources, as evidenced in this China Daily Forum. One post in particular sums up popular sentiment: “Our County! Our River! Our People! Our Blood! Our Treasure!”
In Burma and elsewhere, China’s state-owned energy and extractive firms often engage in direct negotiations with top leaders for energy and mining-related contracts. Some will hire legal counsel or well-known financial consulting firms to advise them or negotiate transactions, but many insist on operating independently, even if doing so means operating without sufficient planning or information.
This has certainly been the case in much of Latin America, where certain Chinese firms prefer "behind closed door" negotiations with national leaders (Chavez, Correa, and Morales, for example) to lengthy arbitration or complex bidding processes. These firms are seeking quick, no-hassle deals, void of regulatory complications. As a result of this preference, however, many end up “stepping on a few toes,” especially in cases where the interests of a country's leaders aren't well-aligned with those of its population.
Chinese scholars and officials are increasingly aware of perils of government-to-government (or Chinese SOE to foreign government) interaction. Following Khadafi-related chaos and Burma blues, China is increasingly cognizant of the fact that it should not rely solely upon agreements with standing governments when making large overseas investments. As one Chinese scholar mentioned to me in a recent conversation, “we can no longer go into places like Myanmar without understanding the population, popular sentiment, or the country’s history.”
Will China refrain from involving itself in high-risk political environments as a result of these setbacks? Probably not. The PRC is committed to securing the resources it needs to support its expanding population and to further promote domestic growth. But in the wake of – and even prior to – FDI setbacks in Burma and Libya, China has been developing a greater capacity for risk assessment. SOE’s own “regional studies desks” are profiling leaders and reporting on environmental issues, cultural considerations, and historic tendencies in countries of interest. The China Development Bank is working closely with state-run think tanks to develop country profiles for various investment destinations.
The Burma hydro-spat is yet another valuable lesson for Chinese extractive industry, energy sector, and political leaders. China is unlikely to withdraw its investments from potentially problematic countries like Venezuela, but these countries’ political, economic, and social dynamics are being considered much more carefully.
When Chinese firm CPI initiated plans for a project on Burma's Irrawaddy River a few months ago, few predicted the public backlash that would ensue. Burma’s abrupt halt of a $3.6 billion Chinese-backed hydro project on September 30th was jarring to Chinese leaders and investors, who perceived Burma as a fairly welcoming investment destination.
As explained in a Washington Post slideshow on the dam debacle, many in Burma are concerned not only about the social and environmental impact of China’s projects, but also about the nature of their country’s broader relations with China. There is significant concern that Burma is becoming “China’s vassal state,” according to former military commander and veteran democracy activist Tin Oo. China is thought to be unfairly exploiting Burma’s natural resources, as evidenced in this China Daily Forum. One post in particular sums up popular sentiment: “Our County! Our River! Our People! Our Blood! Our Treasure!”
In Burma and elsewhere, China’s state-owned energy and extractive firms often engage in direct negotiations with top leaders for energy and mining-related contracts. Some will hire legal counsel or well-known financial consulting firms to advise them or negotiate transactions, but many insist on operating independently, even if doing so means operating without sufficient planning or information.
This has certainly been the case in much of Latin America, where certain Chinese firms prefer "behind closed door" negotiations with national leaders (Chavez, Correa, and Morales, for example) to lengthy arbitration or complex bidding processes. These firms are seeking quick, no-hassle deals, void of regulatory complications. As a result of this preference, however, many end up “stepping on a few toes,” especially in cases where the interests of a country's leaders aren't well-aligned with those of its population.
Chinese scholars and officials are increasingly aware of perils of government-to-government (or Chinese SOE to foreign government) interaction. Following Khadafi-related chaos and Burma blues, China is increasingly cognizant of the fact that it should not rely solely upon agreements with standing governments when making large overseas investments. As one Chinese scholar mentioned to me in a recent conversation, “we can no longer go into places like Myanmar without understanding the population, popular sentiment, or the country’s history.”
Will China refrain from involving itself in high-risk political environments as a result of these setbacks? Probably not. The PRC is committed to securing the resources it needs to support its expanding population and to further promote domestic growth. But in the wake of – and even prior to – FDI setbacks in Burma and Libya, China has been developing a greater capacity for risk assessment. SOE’s own “regional studies desks” are profiling leaders and reporting on environmental issues, cultural considerations, and historic tendencies in countries of interest. The China Development Bank is working closely with state-run think tanks to develop country profiles for various investment destinations.
The Burma hydro-spat is yet another valuable lesson for Chinese extractive industry, energy sector, and political leaders. China is unlikely to withdraw its investments from potentially problematic countries like Venezuela, but these countries’ political, economic, and social dynamics are being considered much more carefully.
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